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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Climate-induced migration has become a global challenge.  Climate change intensifies the 
frequency and severity of disasters, thereby increasing the number of people displaced by extreme 
weather events.  Adverse climate impacts are already exacerbating patterns of human mobility, and 
will do so to a greater degree in the future.  The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) 
reports that approximately 265 million people have been displaced by natural hazards since 2008.  
Over 17 million people were internally displaced by disasters in 2018 alone.  While the majority of 
climate migrants are displaced within their home countries, many people are forced to move abroad.   
The Caribbean region is particularly at risk in regard to climate-induced migration.  The ten 
countries and territories worldwide with the highest average annual internal displacement per 
capita are all small island developing states (SIDS), the top six of which are located in the Caribbean.  
Although SIDS experience lower absolute displacement risk compared with more populous 
countries like India and China, SIDS experience significant displacement relative to their population 
size.  For example, IDMC reported before Hurricane Dorian (2019) that 5.9% of Bahamas’ population 
will be annually displaced by hurricanes.  The 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season also demonstrates the 
extent of displacement risk in the Caribbean; three major hurricanes of the season—Harvey, Irma, 
and Maria—displaced approximately 3 million people in a single month.   
While the Caribbean is particularly susceptible to displacement risk, the region also reveals 
a framework for addressing climate-induced migration; that is, Free Movement Agreements (FMAs).  
FMAs are provisions within (sub-)regional economic integration schemes that liberalize migration 
restrictions between participating member states.  Two FMAs embedded within the (sub-)regional 
economic integration schemes, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Organisation of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS), granted displaced Caribbean nationals important protection benefits after 
catastrophic hurricanes.   
During the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, CARICOM and OECS FMAs i) provided disaster 
displaced persons a right of entry in other islands; ii) supported the waiver of travel document 
requirements where documents had been lost or damaged; iii) granted indefinite stays to some 
disaster displaced persons, facilitating permanent resettlement; and iv) eased access to foreign labor 
markets through a mutual recognition of skills scheme and/or a waiver of work permit requirements.  
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The benefits that the CARICOM and OECS FMAs provided supported migrants in gaining stability 
after sudden-onset disasters, and will be formalized going forward. 
The application of FMAs in post-disaster contexts is possible in other regions.  More than one 
hundred countries worldwide participate in FMAs like that of CARICOM and OECS.  FMAs can 
facilitate migration prompted by both slow- and sudden-onset disasters, and provide access to rights 
of entry, work, and resettlement to climate migrants.  FMAs therefore offer a protection stop-gap in 
the absence of a governing legal framework for addressing climate-induced migration.  Although 
recent international processes like the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Sendai Framework for the 
Disaster Risk Reduction have underscored the importance of climate-induced migration, no 
comprehensive multilateral framework governs the issue, and international law guarantees no 
protection to climate migrants who fall outside the scope of international refugee law.  Regional 
solutions are useful in closing this climate-induced migration protection gap.   
 
Key Findings:  
During the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, the CARICOM and OECS FMAs: 
1. Provided disaster displaced persons a right of entry in other islands;  
§ After Hurricane Maria, Trinidad & Tobago used the CARICOM FMA’s 
6-month visa-free stay provision to shelter displaced Dominicans.  
§ The Antigua, St. Vincent, Grenada and St. Lucia governments 
welcomed Dominicans, making use of the OECS FMA.  
2. Supported the waiver of travel document requirements where documents had been 
lost or damaged;  
§ Immigration officials admitted Dominicans in some cases without the 
national identification documents, including passports, that are 
typically required.  
§ Government officials used other forms of identification, including 
appearance, accent, and family networks, while prioritizing 100% 
admission of arriving Dominican nationals, and speed of registration 
and entry.   
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3. Granted indefinite stays to some disaster displaced persons, facilitating permanent 
resettlement;  
§ The OECS FMA provides every OECS national the right to an indefinite 
stay in other OECS territories which allowed disaster displaced OECS 
nationals to legally resettle.  
4. Eased access to foreign labor markets through a mutual recognition of skills scheme 
and/or a waiver of work permit requirements; 
§ Some displaced CARICOM nationals were able to secure work in other 
CARICOM islands using CARICOM’s work scheme for skilled 
nationals.  
§ OECS automatically grants the right to work to OECS nationals in any 
OECS territory, allowing displaced OECS nationals to seek work in 
other islands.  
 
FMAs should be part of the policy response to climate-induced migration in other regional 
contexts because they: 
1. Respond to the complex and regional nature of climate-induced migration, offering 
migration benefits regardless of whether migrants are moving for climate-specific 
reasons;  
2. Build structural and individual resilience thereby strengthening migration as an 
adaptation response; and 
3.  Can be amended to address climate-induced migration without expending the 
political capital necessary for global multilateral initiatives.   
 
This white paper uses the Caribbean as a case study to demonstrate the utility of FMAs in providing 
a protection framework for climate-induced migration in the absence of a governing multilateral 
framework and guaranteed rights.  Other proposals for addressing climate-induced migration have 
not yet succeeded.  A multilateral convention specifically on climate-induced migration would be 
difficult to design given the difficulty of linking particular instances of migration to any climate-
related event.  Proposals for integrating climate migrants into the international refugee regime face 
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a similar challenge. Providing a climate passport to climate migrants has not yet gained political 
traction.  In contrast, FMAs should be part of the policy response to climate-induced migration 
because they increase regular migration pathways for climate migrants, enhance economic 
resilience, and can bypass the political hurdles of creating an international legal status for climate 
migrants.  
Besides making a case for FMAs as a useful addition to the set of policy tools used to address 
climate-induced migration, this white paper also presents an opportunity to consider climate-
induced migration in a Caribbean context, whereas most research on human mobility and climate 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate-induced migration presents the human face of climate change.  Climate change intensifies 
the frequency and severity of disasters, thereby increasing the number of people displaced by 
extreme weather events.1  Adverse climate change impacts are already exacerbating patterns of 
human mobility, and will do so in greater magnitude in the future.2  The Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Center (IDMC) reports that approximately 265 million people have been displaced due 
to natural hazards since 2008.3  More than 17 million were internally displaced by disasters in 2018 
alone.4  The majority of climate migrants are forced to move within their home countries, posing 
economic, developmental and social challenges for their national governments. However, while the 
majority of climate migrants remain within their own country, many people are also forced to move 
abroad.5   
Cross-border climate-induced migration is a particular challenge for small island developing 
states (SIDS) and low-income countries whose response capacity can be overwhelmed by slow- and 
sudden-onset disasters.6  Internally displaced persons may also become cross-border migrants when 
they are unable to access adequate resources.  Sudden-onset disasters in the Caribbean have already 
led to cross-border displacement from low- and middle-income SIDS.  Hurricane Irma (2017), which 
displaced more than two million people, prompted the wholesale evacuation of the island of 
                                                      
1 Adger, W.N. et al. 2014. “Human Security.” In Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. 
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. C.B. Field et al., 755–791. Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
2 Id.  
3 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Disaster Displacement: A Global Review 2008-2018 (2018).  
4  Vicente Anzellini et al., “Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019” (Geneva, Switzerland: Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre), accessed July 8, 2019, http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2019/. 
5  The Nansen Initiative, “The Nansen Initiative Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in 
the Context of Disasters and Climate Change,” (December 2015), available at https://perma.cc/5E8M-M3DC. 
6 David Cantor, “Law, Policy and Practice Concerning the Humanitarian Protection of Aliens on a Temporary 
Basis in the Context of Disasters” (2015), available at https://perma.cc/VDY5-NZ3M. 
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Barbuda.7  After Hurricane Maria (also 2017), one fifth of Dominica’s population was forced to leave 
the island.8 
Although recent processes like the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration 
(“Global Compact for Migration”), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have underscored the importance of 
addressing cross-border climate-induced migration, international law has yet to provide a 
governing framework for climate-induced migration.  Furthermore, climate migrants enjoy no legal 
status under international law.  While international refugee law provides protection to those 
displaced by instances of social upheaval such as political conflict, international refugee law does 
not provide protection to people solely displaced by climate-related disasters.  The absence of both 
a comprehensive legal framework and legal rights creates a key protection gap for cross-border 
climate migrants.  
 This paper focuses on cross-border climate-induced migration, arguing that free movement 
agreements (FMAs)—provisions within (sub-)regional economic integration schemes that liberalize 
migration restrictions between participating member states—can provide protection benefits in the 
absence of a governing legal framework and guaranteed legal rights.  The paper leverages the 
Caribbean as a case study to make this point.  Part II provides an overview of the climate risks 
Caribbean SIDS face, introduces the concept of climate-induced migration, and analyzes key trends 
in human mobility patterns in the context of climate change.  Part II also describes the legal 
protection gap surrounding climate migrants who are forced to leave their home countries.  Part III 
offers a solution.  Drawing on examples from the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, Part III 
demonstrates how FMAs offer a protection stop-gap for climate-induced migration.  Two Caribbean 
FMAs embedded within the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) allowed disaster displaced persons to enter, work, 
and resettle in nearby Caribbean islands during the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season.  Using the 
Caribbean as a case study, this paper will demonstrate how FMAs increase regular migration 
                                                      
7 IDMC, 2018 Global Report on Internal Displacement – the Americas (2018), available at https://perma.cc/Z5ND-JDYG; 
see also Kate Lyons, The Night Barbuda Died: How Hurricane Irma Created a Caribbean Ghost Town (Nov. 20, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/QN4W-64MZ. 
8 Magnus Hansen, Exodus from Hurricane-Hit Dominica as Recovery Remains Elusive (Oct. 18, 2017), available at 
https://perma.cc/M3E4-Z7ZX. 
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pathways for climate migrants. Part IV argues that FMAs are useful in other regional contexts.  FMAs 
can enhance individual and structural economic resilience and bypass the political hurdles of 
creating an international legal status for climate migrants, while providing a rights-responsive 
framework for facilitating mobility increased by climate change.  
 
 
2. CLIMATE VULNERABILITY & MIGRATION  
2.1 SIDS Climate Challenges  
Climate change poses an existential threat to both Caribbean and Pacific SIDS.  The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that increased aridity, decreased 
freshwater availability and sea level rise might render several atoll islands “uninhabitable” at 1.5°C 
of global warming.9  Average global temperature will increase by 1.5°C as early as 2030 at the current 
rate of global GHG emissions.10  Thus  several atoll islands could become uninhabitable within the 
coming decades.     
Impacts associated with sea level rise could also render atoll islands uninhabitable before 
they are completely submerged under water.  Saltwater intrusion, soil salinization, and flooding 
undermine fresh water availability and agricultural capacity, elements necessary for sustaining 
human life.  Frequent flooding destroys housing and infrastructure, and can wipe out livelihoods. 
Multiple Pacific islands have already reported increased water and food insecurity due to sea level 
rise. 
In the Caribbean, increasingly intense and frequent storms also pose an existential challenge. 
A single extreme weather event can cause extensive economic damage, and roll back significant 
                                                      
9 Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018: Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems. In: Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V. et al. (eds.)]. In Press. 
10 IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of 
global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of 
strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-
Delmotte, V. et al. (eds.)]. World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 32 pp.  
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development gains.  Extreme weather events can also systematically disrupt infrastructure networks 
and erode the provision of important services like running water and electricity.11  Hurricane Maria, 
for example, caused the equivalent of over 226% of GDP in total damages and losses in Dominica, 
and resulted in the failure of electricity service due to extensive damage to the transmission and 
distribution network. 12   With increasing climate change, the frequency of such economic and 
infrastructural devastation will increase.13  While sea level rise in the Pacific has come to define the 
existential threat climate change poses to SIDS, an average global temperature over 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels also poses a significant risk to Caribbean islands.  Frequent storms threaten to 
render Caribbean SIDS economically inviable without significant adaptation measures.  
Climate risk in the Caribbean also alters migration dynamics.  Recent trends in Caribbean 
migration flows show a high level of environmental migration, alongside the outmigration of skilled 
professionals to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, a 
disproportionate number of female migrants, and both voluntary and forced returns to the region.14  
Scientists forecast that natural hazards, like tropical cyclones, heavy rains and floods, as well as 
droughts and sea level rise, will have the greatest impact on climate-induced migration in the 
region. 15   Indeed, sudden-onset disasters in the Caribbean have already led to increased out-
migration from disaster-impacted countries.16  For example, Hurricane Irma, the most powerful 
                                                      
11 IPCC, 2014: Summary for policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: 
Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [Field, C.B. et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, 
USA, pp. 1-32. 
12 Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Hurricane Maria (Sept. 18, 2017), 
available at https://perma.cc/8ZVZ-U6EW. 
13  Oppenheimer, M. et al., 2014: Emergent risks and key vulnerabilities. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B. et al. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1039-1099. 
14 IOM, Migration Governance in the Caribbean: Report on the Island States of the Commonwealth Caribbean 15 (2018) 
available at https://perma.cc/9PL8-9K42.  
15 Raoul Kaenzig & Etienne Piguet, Migration and Climate Change in Latin America and the Caribbean, in PEOPLE ON 
THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 155, 155 (2014).   
16  O.C. Andrade Afonso, Natural Disasters and Migration: Storms in Central America and the Caribbean and 
Immigration to the U.S. (2011), available at https://perma.cc/2YSK-Y68G; see also J. Baez, G. Caruso, V. Mueller and C. Niu, 
Heat Exposure and Youth Migration in Central America and the Caribbean, 107 AM. ECON. R.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 446 
(2017); J. Baez, G. Caruso, V. Mueller and C. Niu, Droughts Augment Youth Migration in Northern Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 140 CLIMATIC CHANGE 423 (2017); R.J. Nawrotzki, J. DeWaard, M. Bakhtsiyarava and J. Trang Ha, Climate Shocks 
and Rural-Urban Migration on Mexico: Exploring Nonlinearities and Thresholds, 140 CLIMATIC CHANGE 243 (2017); A. Cordero 
Ulate and G. Lathrop, Relaciones entre Medio Ambiente y Migraciones en República Dominicana (IOM 2016). 
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hurricane on record in the Atlantic, displaced two million people.17  Over  8.5 million people were 
displaced between 2008-2018 in 21 Caribbean countries. 18   Displacement has significant 
consequences for development, health, human and national security, and livelihoods 19 ; thus 
solutions to climate-induced migration remain critical.  
 
2.2 Defining Climate-induced migration    
Although migration has long been prompted by environmental disasters, climate change 
exacerbates this phenomenon.20  The risk of being displaced by a disaster has quadrupled since the 
1970s.21  After correcting for population growth, the likelihood of a person being displaced by a 
disaster has increased by 60% in the last 40 years worldwide.22  IDMC reports that 34 million people 
were displaced by sudden-onset disasters in 2008 alone, with 56% being displaced by climate-related 
disasters that year.23  While the majority of climate migrants remain within their own country, some 
migrants are forced to move abroad due to both slow- and sudden- onset natural hazards.  
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines an environmental migrant as 
“persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the 
environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual 
homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their 
country or abroad.”24  Although international law provides no definition of a climate migrant, 
climate-induced migration falls within the sub-category of environmental migration.  Indeed, like 
                                                      
17 IOM supra note 14.  
18 Caribbean Migration Consultations (CMC), Consultation Towards a Framework for Regional Cooperation on Human 
Mobility in the Context of Disasters and the Adverse Effects of Climate Change in the Caribbean (June 2019), available at 
https://perma.cc/42AB-SHH4. 
19 World Bank, Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration (2018), available at https://perma.cc/HS6C-
7GA9.  
20 Jane McAdam ed., CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT 1 (2010). 
21 Justin Ginetti, Disaster-Related Displacement Risk: Measuring the Risk and Addressing Its Drivers (IDMC, 2015).  
22 Jon Barnett & W. Neil Adger, Mobile Worlds: Choice at the Intersection of Demographic and Environmental Change, 
43 Ann. Rev. Env’t & Res. 245, 252 (2018). 
23  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, Monitoring Disaster Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Findings of a Study of the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (OCHA, 
IDMC and the Norwegian Council 2009) 8. 
24 International Organization for Migration, Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment, MC/INF/288 (Nov. 1. 
2007), para. 6, available at https://perma.cc/8SY6-4T72. 
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environmental migration, climate-induced migration can describe movement that is temporary or 
permanent, voluntary or forced, internal or cross-border.   
Climate-induced migration occurs mostly within national borders, over short distances, with 
wealthier and more educated migrants tending to cross national borders.  Policy experts identify 
five categories of movement, first described by Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer: i) migration 
prompted by sudden onset disasters, for example flooding and hurricanes, which tends to be 
temporary and internal; ii) slow-onset degradation, for example rising sea levels, increased 
groundwater and soil salinization, which often results in permanent migration; iii) “‘sinking’ small 
island states” which present a unique case of slow-onset disasters wherein rising sea levels combine 
with low-lying island topography to render islands uninhabitable; iv) high risk zones that 
governments declare dangerous for human habitation; and v) forced displacement due to violence, 
armed conflict, or unrest because of a scarcity of essential resources like water, arable land, or 
grazing grounds.25  
Across all categories, adverse environmental impacts do not lead to migration in a linear 
way; empirical studies have shown that many other factors play into the decision to move or stay.26  
Economic, social, and political drivers shape migration alongside climate change and other 
environmental indicators. 27   As the Foresight Report notes, “the range and complexity of the 
interactions” among drivers “means that it will rarely be possible to distinguish individuals for 
whom environmental actors are the sole driver.”28  As a general matter, economic factors play a 
larger role in determining migration outcomes than environmental drivers at both the individual 
and structural level.29   
 
                                                      
25 Walter Kälin & Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change Normative 
Gaps and Possible Approaches, UNHCR, 13-7 (Feb. 2012), https://perma.cc/XGW9-5SMP.  
26 DOMINIC KNIVETON ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: IMPROVING METHODOLOGIES TO ESTIMATE FLOWS 6 
(2008). 
27 Foresight, Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities (2011), available at 
https://perma.cc/GK84-7ADS.  
28 Id.  
29 Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change 6  
(2010), available at https://perma.cc/REW8-T9PH.  
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2.3 Identifying the Legal Gap  
A protection gap exists for migrants displaced across national borders by sudden- and slow-onset 
disasters, particularly from island and low-capacity states.  This protection gap arises from the fact 
that international law does not confer a general right of entry for admission into a foreign country;30 
although migrants who qualify for protection under refugee law or complementary measures are 
protected from being rejected at the border.31  Where displacement occurs across borders, then, 
climate migrants find themselves with no right to enter another state, remain there, or be protected 
against forcible return.32   Instead, the status of these displaced persons is dependent upon the 
“generosity of host countries.”33  In fact, the only situation in which international law may afford a 
right of entry to climate migrants occurs when environmental drivers combine with established 
grounds for protection under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee 
Convention).34  
The 1951 Refugee Convention extends protection to petitioners with a well-founded fear of 
persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular 
social group.  The petitioner must also be unable to gain protection from their home country.  
Although home governments may be unable or unwilling to protect those affected by climate-related 
events, the narrow grounds for persecution “makes it difficult to apply” the refugee convention to 
climate migrants seeking to resettle in receiving countries.35  Persecution usually requires human 
agency, which climate impacts do not satisfy. 36   Furthermore, fleeing a slow- or sudden-onset 
disaster does not trigger any Convention ground—persecution due to race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.37  To date, no court has extended 
protection based on international refugee law to a climate migrant.		In the 15-year period between 
                                                      
30 GUY GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 94 (1977). 
31 Walter Kälin, Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT 81, 87 (Jane 
McAdam ed., 2010).  
32 Id. at 86-91.  
33 Kälin supra note 31 at 90-91. 
34 Id. at 92.  
35 See NZ Case Teitiota – Kiribati; United Nations Convention Relating to the Satuts of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), 
opened for signature July 28, 1981, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
36 Jane McAdam, Building International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement, 33 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 1, 4 (2016). 
37 Id. at 5.  
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2000 and 2015, Pacific Islanders argued in more than twenty administrative and judicial cases in 
Australia and New Zealand that they should receive protection under refugee law because of climate 
change; none succeeded.38  
For example, in Ioane Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment, the New Zealand Supreme Court found that an I-Kiribati citizen, Teitiota, did not 
qualify as a refugee under international law.  Teitiota sought refugee status in New Zealand because 
of the effects of sea level rise and environmental degradation in his home island Kiribati.39  The Court 
found that Teitiota’s case did not meet the required elements for refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention because “while Kiribati undoubtedly faces challenges, Mr. Teitiota does not, if returned, 
face ‘serious harm’ and there is no evidence that the Government of Kiribati is failing to take steps 
to protect its citizens from the effects of environmental degradation to the extent that it can.”40  The 
Court noted, however, that its decision does not mean “that environmental degradation resulting 
from climate change or other natural disasters could never create a pathway into the Refugee 
Convention or protected person jurisdiction.”41  
In contrast, New Zealand’s Immigration and Protection Tribunal did grant a resident visa to 
a family from Tuvalu based on “exceptional circumstances.”42  In In re: AD (Tuvalu) (2014), a family 
from Tuvalu sought resident visas in New Zealand.  The family argued that they would suffer if 
they were deported to Tuvalu because of climate change impacts.  The Immigration and Protection 
Tribunal found that the family had established “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature, 
                                                      
38  Jane McAdam, Building International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement, 
33 WINDSORY.B. ACCESS JUST. 1, 5 (2016); AF (Tuvalu), [2015] NZIPT 800859; AD (Tuvalu), [2014] NZIPT 501370; AC 
(Tuvalu), [2014] NZIPT 800517–520 [AC (Tuvalu)]; Teitiota 2013, supra note 15; Teitiota 2014, supra note 14; AF (Kiribati) 
2013, supra note 15; Refugee Appeal no 72719/2001, RSAA (17 September 2001) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72313/2000, 
RSAA (19 October 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72314/2000, RSAA (19 October 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 
72315/2000, RSAA (19 October 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72316/2000, RSAA (19 October 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee 
Appeal nos 72179–72181/2000, RSAA (31 August 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal nos 72189–72195/2000, RSAA (17 August 
2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72185/2000, RSAA (10 August 2000) (Tuvalu); Refugee Appeal no 72186/2000, RSAA 
(10 August 2000) (Tuvalu). Australian cases: 1004726, [2010] RRTA 845 (30 September 2010) (Tonga); 0907346, [2009] RRTA 
1168 (10 December 2009) (Kiribati); N00/34089, [2000] RRTA 1052 (17 November 2000) (Tuvalu); N95/09386, [1996] RRTA 
3191 (7 November 1996) (Tuvalu); N96/10806, [1996] RRTA 3195 (7 November 1996) (Tuvalu); N99/30231, [2000] RRTA 17 
(10 January 2000) (Tuvalu); V94/02840, [1995] RRTA 2383 (23 October 1995) (Tuvalu). 
39 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, [2014] NZCA 173 (New Zealand).   
40 Id. at para 12.  
41 Id. at para 13.  
42 Id. at para 30.  
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which would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellants to be removed from New Zealand” 
pursuant to New Zealand’s Immigration Act of 2009.43  The Tribunal based its finding partly on the 
fact that the family had relatives already residing in New Zealand.  The Tribunal declined to reach 
the question of whether climate change provided a basis for granting resident visas in this case, 
although the Tribunal acknowledged that climate change impacts may undermine the enjoyment of 
human rights.  
Some regional bodies have expanded the refugee definition such that climate migrants could 
qualify.  The 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention extends protection to persons fleeing 
to another country because of “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order.”44  The 1984 Cartagena Declaration’s definition similarly includes 
those who are displaced because their “lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized 
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other 
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”45  Both these frameworks have been 
used in cases of environmental migration.  The OAU Convention was mobilized in 2011 and 2012 
by Kenya, Ethiopia and other East African countries, who accepted 300,000 Somali refugees fleeing 
severe drought. 46  Ecuador used the Cartagena Declaration to admit Haitians fleeing the 2010 
earthquake.47  Nevertheless, these regional interventions remain the exception, not the norm.   
Scholars and practitioners have responded to the protection gap surrounding climate-
induced migration by arguing for: i) the integration of disaster displaced persons into the 
international refugee law framework; ii) the expansion of existing bilateral and regional protective 
programs and provisions; and/or iii) the creation of new legal devices.  Early interventions, 
sometimes state-backed, called for the inclusion of climate-induced migration within international 
                                                      
43 Id.  
44 African Union, Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) Article 2. 
45 Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees (1984) Conclusion III.3.  
46 Walter Kälin, Interview: Deciding Whether to Migrate and Where to Go, available at https://perma.cc/MTP3-8A2U.  
47 David Cantor, Cross-border Displacement, Climate Change and Disasters: Latin America and the Caribbean (July 
2018).  
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refugee law.48  Scholars have also advanced proposals for new multilateral governance frameworks 
for climate-induced migration based on the 1951 Refugee Convention.49   
Beyond academic debate, climate-induced migration has finally gained traction in the 
international community.  Starting with the Cancun Adaptation Framework, human mobility was 
first recognized within the global climate debate within the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change in 2010. 50   The landmark Paris Agreement helped build this momentum, 
establishing in 2015 the Task Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism for 
Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts to “avert, minimize and address 
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”51  The Global Compact on Migration 
crystallized this momentum, recognizing climate change as a unique migration driver in 2018.52  
The Global Compact on Migration, the first international cooperative agreement on 
migration, evolved from a concerted push towards increasing state-sponsored legal migration 
pathways, including for climate migrants.  Endorsed by over 160 countries, the Global Compact on 
Migration recognizes that national and regional actors may be in the best position to address climate-
induced migration.53  The Global Compact on Migration recommends that states increase regular 
migration opportunities—including humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, and temporary work 
permits—in response to slow- and sudden-onset disasters in order to ensure that migration becomes 
an experience of dignity rather than an act of despair.54   
                                                      
48 Harriet Grant et al., UK Should Open Borders to Climate Refugees Says Bangladeshi Minister, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 
4, 2009, 3:55 PM), https://perma.cc/7BFC-KCR7. The Bangladeshi Finance Minister before the Copenhagen climate change 
conference pushed for the revision of the 1951 Refugee Convention to include climate migrants. The Maldives made a 
similar proposal earlier in 2006.  
49 Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect 
Climate Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 60 (2010); David Hodgkinson et al., ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes In’: A Convention 
for Persons Displaced by Climate Change, 36 MONASH UNIV. L. REV. 69 (2010). See also Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, 
Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 349 (2009) (proposing 
a multilateral treaty that addresses cross-border climate-induced migration).  
50  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun 
Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the 
Convention (UNFCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, para 14(f). 
51 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 21st session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 
December 2015, Decision 1/CP.21, para. 49.  
52 The Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2018), available at https://perma.cc/WZ5H-Z6XN 
(“The Global Compact on Migration.”).  
53 Platform on Disaster Displacement, State-Led, Regional, Consultative Processes: Opportunities to Develop Legal 
Frameworks on Disaster Displacement, in in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES’: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE 126, 145 (Simon Berhman & 
Avidan Kent eds., 2018).  
54 The Global Compact on Migration supra note 52.   
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As the international conversation on climate-induced migration develops, FMAs should be 
included in the set of policy proposals states consider.  Part III introduces FMAs, and makes a case 
for including them as part of the solution to climate-induced migration.   
 
 
3. FREE MOVEMENT AGREEMENTS  
3.1 Overview  
Free Movement Agreements (FMAs) are provisions within (sub-)regional economic integration 
schemes that liberalize mobility restrictions between participating member states.  The agreements 
range from removing visa requirements for entry into member states to more comprehensive rights 
to reside and work.55  FMAs can also provide for the mutual recognition of skills and transfer of 
social security rights.56  The agreements may be applied unevenly, with rights and benefits extended 
to pre-defined categories of people, including migrant workers, business people, students and 
refugees.57  In most regions, FMAs are linked to a common market, where free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labor serve as the basis of economic integration, and workers are granted the 
right to enter, work and/or settle in member states.58   
The EU serves as the most well-known example, but FMAs exist across all continents, with 
approximately 120 countries participating in regional arrangements that include free movement 
provisions.59  FMAs proliferated with the rise of regional trade agreements.60  Africa has adopted the 
largest number of FMAs, present within the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East Africa 
                                                      
55 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), MIGRATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION xv (Phillipe de Lombaerde et al. eds., 2017). 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at XX.  
58 Sonja Nita, Free Movement of People within Regional Integration Processes: A Comparative View, in MIGRATION, FREE 
MOVEMENT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 3, 7 (Phillipe de Lombaerde et al. eds., 2017).  The EU, ECOWAS, MERCOSUR, 
and CARICOM all adhere to this rubric of free movement within a common market.  
59 Vincent Chetail, The Transnational Movement of Persons under General International Law - Mapping the Customary 
Law Foundations of International Migration Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MIGRATION 1, 35 
(Vincent Chetail & Céline Bauloz eds., 2014).  
60 Id. at 33-4. 
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Community (EAC), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS).61  Asia-Pacific FMAs include the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  The 
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) serve as prominent examples in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.62 
Rights of entry within FMAs range from relaxing visa requirements for intra-regional travel 
to authorizing indefinite stays.  Some agreements allow for visa free travel, although most grant a 
temporary visa extension.  Within Europe, for example, the Schengen Agreement authorizes visa-
free travel for citizens of member states within the Schengen Area.  FMAs generally stipulate that 
entry can be barred if admission would contravene public policy, public security or public health.63  
Some FMAs grant residence rights, with most agreements conditioning residence on employment.64  
The conditioning of residence on employment accords with the aim of most FMAs—to facilitate the 
movement of labor. 
Indeed, FMAs often address labor directly, either facilitating labor migration or granting 
access to labor markets for certain categories of people, often highly skilled workers.  For example, 
Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Regulation 1612/68 grants 
nationals of EU member states the right to work in any other member state without a work permit. 
This right includes equality of treatment, remuneration, and working conditions compared to 
nationals of the host state.65  Similarly, Article 2 of ECOWAS grants the right of residence “for the 
purpose of seeking and carrying out income earning employment,” although those making use of 
the framework must apply for a residence card.66  Some FMAs follow the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) model by granting labor market access only to service providers on a 
                                                      
61 Id.  
62 Chetail supra note 59.   
63 Nita supra note 58 at 11-15.  The EU is an outlier in stipulating visa-free travel—most agreements grant only 
temporary visa exemption.  
64 Id.    
65 Id. at 18.  
66 Id. at 19. The supplementary protocol in 1986 granted the right to work.  
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temporary basis, while others aim to protect the rights of migrant workers instead of regulating 
market access.67 
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67 Id. at 18.  
68 Adapted from UNESCO supra note 55.  
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Some FMAs have evolved beyond their common original purpose, that is to liberalize 
restrictions on the movement of labor, and have moved toward creating social citizenship.  For 
example, MERCOSUR, established in March 1991 among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay 
by the Treaty of Asunción, now aims to “promote channels for social participation as a key way of 
strengthening regional integration.”69  Mutual recognition of skills and qualifications is one aspect 
of FMAs that coheres to both the economic and social aims of these agreements, alongside social, 
health and labor regulations.  CARICOM, for example, allows workers to secure social security 
benefits from the schemes to which they have contributed outside of their country of origin.  The 
development of FMAs beyond regulating migration of labor signals their capacity to address other 
types of human mobility.  
 
3.2 A Caribbean Case Study  
3.2.1. Operation in 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season   
The Caribbean region demonstrates the possibility of adapting FMAs to the climate change context.  
Two Caribbean FMAs embedded within CARICOM and OECS have already facilitated migration 
after sudden-onset disasters, presenting an example of the benefits FMAs can potentially offer 
climate migrants.  During the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season, the CARICOM and OECS FMAs i) 
provided disaster displaced persons a right of entry in other islands; ii) supported the waiver of 
travel document requirements where documents had been lost or damaged; iii) granted indefinite 
stays in some cases, facilitating permanent resettlement; and iv) gave access to foreign labor markets 
through a mutual recognition of skills scheme and/or a waiver of work permit requirements.   
Both the CARICOM and OECS FMAs’ main goal is to support regional economic integration, 
despite their utility in an environmental context.  CARICOM—a regional grouping of fifteen 
member states representing 16 million people—was established by the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas 
                                                      
69 Carla Gallinati & Natalia Gavazzo, ‘We Are All MERCOSUR’: Discourses and Practices about Free Movement in the 
Current Regional Integration of South-America, in MIGRATION, FREE MOVEMENT AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 201, 202 (Phillipe 
de Lombaerde et al. eds., 2017). 
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to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to merchandise trade.70  The 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas 
originally did not conceive of free movement of persons, although it did set up a common market to 
promote economic integration between and development of member states.71  Since 1973, CARICOM 
has developed various bodies and schemes to facilitate integration goals, the most notable of 
which—the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)—permits free movement of goods, 
capital and labor among member states.72  Article 45 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas sets a 
goal of free movement of all member state citizens between member territories, regardless of their 
employment status.73  Article 46 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas provides for the movement 
of skilled community nationals, which allows certain categories of workers to access CARICOM 
island labor markets without a work permit.  
Free movement rights can be exercised under three elements of the CSME: the movement of 
skills, services, and the right of establishment.74  Skilled CARICOM nationals—including university 
graduates, teachers, nurses, and artists—may apply for a Certificate of Recognition of Skills 
Qualification (Skills Certificate) to work in other member states.75  The Skills Certificate does not 
guarantee permanent residence, but skilled nationals may apply after admission;76  skilled nationals 
may also move with their dependents.77  Service providers enjoy movement modeled on the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), but are guaranteed the same treatment as nationals while 
conducting “approved activities.” 78   Meanwhile, self-employed nationals engaged in non-wage 
                                                      
70 Sophie Nonnenmacher, Free Movement of Persons in the Caribbean Community, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 
387 (Ryszard Cholewinski et al. eds., 2007); Who We Are, CARICOM, https://perma.cc/G6VE-M53C (last visited Apr. 18, 
2019).  
71 CARICOM, Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, Art. 38 (1973), available at https://perma.cc/LM8N-
BLG2.  
72  Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 389; see also Chad Damro, The Political Economy of Regional Trade 
Agreements, in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System 23, 33-34 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 
2006).  
 
73 CARICOM, Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Art. 45 (2001) available at  https://perma.cc/8HRR-QBC6.  
74 Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 391.   
75 CARICOM supra note 72 at Art. 46 (providing for the movement of skilled nationals as a step towards general 
free movement within member state); see also CARICOM, Single Market and Economy, Free Movement – Travel and Work 20-
26 (3d. Edition), available at https://perma.cc/SUR4-NGQM. 
76 CARICOM, Single Market and Economy at 34-35.  
77 Id. at 36. But see Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 395 (noting that national law defines dependents according to 
income tax legislation and social security schemes which leads to uneven application of right of free movement for 
dependents.).  
78 Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 393.   
Free Movement Agreements & Climate-Induced Migration: A Caribbean Case Study 
 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School 16 
 
earning activities that are commercial, industrial, agricultural, professional or artisanal can enjoy an 
indefinite stay in another member state by exercising their right to establish a business or right of 
establishment.79  All CARICOM nationals are entitled to 6-month visa-free stays in other member 
states, unless they are deemed a threat to national security, public safety, order, or morals, or any 
other basis set out by the Caribbean Court of Justice.80 
The CARICOM FMA also establishes social measures to facilitate movement.  Social security 
benefits, for example, can be transferred between states.81  The CARICOM Agreement on Social 
Security was established in 1996 to ensure that those who migrate to a member state to work, or have 
worked in multiple member states, have access to benefits from social security schemes to which 
they have contributed.82  The agreement covers contributory pensions for invalidity, disability, old 
age, and death and survivors’ benefits.  The agreement does not cover maternity or sickness benefits. 
The CARICOM Protocol on Contingent Rights (“the Protocol”) also aims to support CARICOM 
nationals exercising their right of establishment, provision of services, movement of capital or free 
movement of skills. The Protocol extends rights to dependents, grants access to primary education, 
and ensures a range of property rights.83  The Protocol is not yet in force.  
Although only 10% of the collective population of CARICOM member states constitute 
skilled nationals, there has been a growing number of CARICOM nationals who have migrated to 
other CARICOM countries under the CSME.84  Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
and Grenada all reported an increased number of CARICOM nationals with verified Skills 
Certificates in their countries from 2013 to 2016. 85   Barbados verified as many as 2,166 Skills 
Certificates in 2016, representing 1% of its total population.  Indeed, most immigration to Barbados, 
                                                      
79 Id. at 394.  
80 CARICOM, Single Market and Economy at 35.  
81 IOM supra note 14 at 19; see also Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 395 (The 1997 CARICOM Agreement on Social 
Security “protects all entitlements to long-term benefits by providing for the totalization of all periods in which 
contributions were paid to social security stems in Member States, and is operational in all Members.”); CARICOM, The 
1994 Intra-Regional Double Taxation Agreement prevents self-employed CARICOM nationals from paying taxes twice. Agreement 
Among the Governments of Member States of the Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, Profits or Gains and Capital Gains and for the Encouragement of Regional Trade and 
Investment (1994), available at https://perma.cc/7YSZ-GHCS. 
82 CARICOM, Social Security in CARICOM, available at https://perma.cc/KBF6-PG73.  
83 CARICOM, Protocol on Contingent Rights, available at https://perma.cc/R6D2-GN67.  
84 Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 390.    
85 Data on file with author.  
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the CARICOM country which receives the highest number of skilled nationals under CSME, occurs 
through legal migration pathways, and the extension of free movement protocols to new categories 
of workers helps to ensure regularized movement of migrants to Barbados.86  Recently, CARICOM 
expanded the categories of workers eligible for a Skills Certificate to agricultural workers and 
security guards, and contemplated including domestic workers.87    
OECS, established by the Treaty of Basseterre in 1981, also features a FMA that has facilitated 
mobility after sudden-onset disasters. 88   OECS promotes integration between its full member 
states—Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines—on matters such as foreign policy, defense and security, and 
economic development.  The OECS Economic Union, established in January 2011, creates a single 
financial and economic space wherein goods, services and people move without restriction.89  Article 
3 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre sets a principle of “the abolition . . . of the obstacles to the free 
movement of persons, services and capital.”90  Article 12 ensures freedom of movement for OECS 
nationals within the OECS Economic Union Area, including non-discriminatory access to 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment regardless of nationality.  
 Article 12 also provides that “citizens of Protocol member states shall enjoy in the 
Economic Union Area the rights contingent to the right of freedom of movement that are agreed by 
Protocol Member States.”91  These rights were articulated in the OECS Policy on Rights Contingent 
to the Freedom of Movement.  According to the policy, approved by OECS Heads of State in 2015, 
the same general and social rights/privileges that are accorded to citizens of the host member state 
should be extended to all OECS nationals and their spouses and dependents. These rights include 
access to social systems, labor market schemes, public health care, and education services.   
The Revised Treaty of Basseterre also links the principle of free movement of persons to an 
overall goal of sustainable cultural and economic development in the region.  Article 23 recognizes 
                                                      
86 CMC supra note 18 at 13.  
87 CMC, CARICOM Labour Ministers to Meet Wednesday to Discuss Free Movement for Security Guards and 
Agricultural Workers, ST. LUCIA NEWS ONLINE (Feb 5., 2019), https://perma.cc/KC4F-FSWX. 
88 Nonnenmacher supra note 69 at 387.  
89 IOM supra note 14 at 20.  
90 OECS, Revised Treaty of Basseterre, Art. 3 (2010), available at https://perma.cc/U9ER-HA4H. 
91 Id. at Art. 12. 
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that the principle of free movement of persons is linked to ensuring a safe and stable society, and 
requires states to “provide the enabling legislative, policy and administrative environment needed 
to support social relations and cohesion for children, youth, men and women in the Economic Union 
Area, with particular attention to the consequences and impact of the free movement of peoples on 
shared family responsibilities and economic stability.”92  While CARICOM extends free movement 
to specific categories of workers, all OECS nationals enjoy the right to live and work in other OECS 
member states.93   These benefits apply equally in a post-disaster context, where OECS citizens 
should have “unimpeded access to the territory of other OECS States.”94 
Indeed, both the CARICOM and OECS FMAs were operationalized during the 2017 Atlantic 
Hurricane Season, during which time three hurricanes displaced three million people in a single 
month.95  After Hurricane Maria, Trinidad and Tobago used the CARICOM FMA’s 6-month visa-
free stay provision to shelter displaced Dominicans.96  The Antigua, St. Vincent, Grenada and St. 
Lucia governments also welcomed Dominicans, making use of the OECS FMA.97  In some cases, 
immigration officials admitted Dominicans without the national identification documents—
including passports—that are typically required.  In these cases, government officials used other 
forms of identification, including appearance, accent, and family networks, prioritizing 100% 
admission of arriving Dominican nationals, as well as speed of registration and entry.  Finally, St. 
Lucia also housed prisoners from the British Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands after 
Hurricane Irma damaged prisons.98   
 
3.2.2. Challenges  
The application of Caribbean labor mobility frameworks in post-disaster contexts does pose 
challenges.  First, immigration officials operating at the border enjoy a high level of discretion. While 
                                                      
92 Id. at Art. 23.  
93 Id. at Art. 3(c) & 12. 
94 Cantor supra note 47 at 57. 
95 UNFCCC, Warsaw International Mechanism Task Force on Displacement Activites III.1-3 (2018), available at  
https://perma.cc/8F22-RQYG. 
96 T&T PM Asks Citizens to Welcome Dominicans Devastated by Hurricane Maria, STABROEK NEWS (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/3VKN-F4G7. 
97 Antigua Prepares for Influx of Dominicans, BARBADOS TODAY (Sept. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/6X2V-N55A. 
98 Puerto Rico Opens Arms to Refugee from Irma’s Caribbean Chaos, REUTERS, (Sept. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/8VDH-
GM5J. Cantor supra note 47 at 58.  
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this discretion facilitated 100% admission of Dominican nationals after Hurricane Maria, border 
officials could also deny entry to disaster displaced persons in the future, especially if nationals were 
considered a threat to the public interest.99  Member states may tighten migration policies if the 
number of disaster displaced persons in the region swells due to increased adverse climate effects, 
or in response to domestic political pressures. 
 Second, third country nationals who normally fall outside the scope of these free movement 
regimes may have enjoyed the opportunity to more easily participate in irregular migration during 
the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane season.  Both St. Lucia and St. Vincent admitted medical students who 
were not covered under the OECS FMA. St. Vincent reportedly lost track of some of these third 
country nationals. St. Lucian authorities also faced difficulty distinguishing Haitian nationals from 
Dominicans; Dominicans, unlike Haitians, are entitled to indefinite stay in St. Lucia.  Going forward 
it will be important to establish a normative framework for the application of Caribbean labor 
mobility regimes in a post-disaster context.   
In sum, Caribbean islands used the CARICOM and OECS FMAs to assist disaster displaced 
persons during the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane season, but application varied based on national context.  
As the Executive Director of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency noted, 
protection measures for disaster displaced persons “need full consideration within the context of 
CARICOM’s broader policy but also individual national government policies.”100   Recently, Latin 
American and Caribbean countries agreed on guidance for responses to cross-border displacement 
in the context of climate change and disasters with the 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action.  
The Immigration and Customs Working Group on Disaster—a coalition between the Caribbean 
Disaster Emergency Management Agency, CARICOM IMPACS and national immigration 
officials—is also aiming to formalize the practices that facilitated movement during the 2017 Atlantic 
Hurricane Season, and ensured Caribbean nationals access to entry, labor markets, resettlement, and 
contingent rights.  Formalizing best practices may set the Caribbean up to serve as a model to other 
regions.  
                                                      
99 CARICOM supra note 79 at 34-35.    
100 CDEMA, Statement by Mr. Ronald Jackson, Executive Director of CDEMA on the recognition of International Day for 
Disaster Reduction (Oct. 13, 2017), available at https://perma.cc/DNA7-UWLZ. 
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4. APPLICABILITY OF FMAS IN OTHER REGIONS 
The use of Caribbean Free Movement Agreements (FMAs) during the 2017 Atlantic 
Hurricane Season points to broader arguments for leveraging FMAs as a protection framework for 
climate-induced migration.  Given that approximately 120 countries worldwide participate in FMAs, 
the applicability of FMAs in post-disaster contexts is relevant to regions other than the Caribbean. 
Indeed, the Platform on Disaster Displacement, the leading intergovernmental initiative on 
environmental migration, identifies FMAs as one example of state-led humanitarian protection 
measures that can fill the protection gap for disaster displaced people.101  The Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa is currently developing a protocol on the free 
movement of persons to implement Art. 7(b) of the Agreement establishing IGAD,102 and may 
include protections for climate migrants. African FMAs provide three key benefits to climate 
migrants; that is, African FMAs give access to territory, grant status and rights during stay, and 
provide opportunities for lasting solutions.103   
FMAs serve as a useful protection framework for climate migrants from various regions for 
three reasons: 1) FMAs respond to the complex and regional nature of climate-induced migration; 
2) FMAs build individual and structural resilience; and 3) the expansion of FMAs to account for 
climate-induced migration is politically feasible.  As climate change exacerbates the frequency and 
intensity of disaster, increasing the number of displaced people, effective policy responses like FMAs 
will become increasingly critical. 
 
i. FMAs respond to the complex and regional nature of climate-induced migration   
 
Cross-border climate-induced migration is both multi-causal and regional in nature.  Climate 
migrants may be displaced by, or move due to, a combination of economic, political, and social 
                                                      
101 Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), State-Led, Regional, Consultative Processes: Opportunities to Develop 
Legal Frameworks on Disaster Displacement, in ‘CLIMATE REFUGEES’: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE 126, 135 (Simon Berhman & 
Avidan Kent eds., 2018); see also Elizabeth Ferris, Governance and Climate Change-Induced Mobility: International and Regional 
Frameworks, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 11, 24 (Dimitra Manou et 
al. eds., 2017) (noting that FMAs “might well be the most productive means to address future cross-border movements 
resulting from the effects of climate change.”).  
102 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Agreement Establishing IGAD, Art. 7(b) (1996).  
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factors.  Furthermore, as is true of global migration generally, most cross-border climate-induced 
migration occurs regionally.104  The variety in cause (drought, sea-level rise, storms, floods, etc.), 
type of movement (short term/long term, internal/regional/international), nature of migration 
(voluntary versus forced), and the difficulty in establishing a direct causal link between climate 
change and migration have all undermined attempts to address the climate-induced migration 
protection gap.105  FMAs have the potential to address the gap because they are responsive to the 
complex and regional nature of climate-induced migration; these agreements allow for movement 
before, during, or after a slow- or sudden-onset event, thereby increasing mobility options regardless 
of whether movement was forced or voluntary, is temporary or permanent, or directly caused by 
climate change.  
FMAs can be responsive to migrant needs in the absence of sharply delineated causal factors.  
Notwithstanding whether cross-border displacement was prompted by a sudden- and/or slow-onset 
event, or economic or environmental drivers, FMAs respond not to the root cause of displacement 
but to its effects.  Because the benefits of FMAs are conferred based on nationality, climate migrants 
can access territory, safety, and even labor markets without having to prove that they are climate 
migrants.  This makes FMAs a particularly useful policy intervention because of the multi-causal 
nature of climate-induced migration, and the difficulty of distinguishing climate migrants from 
other categories of people on the move.106 
In other words, FMAs have a significant advantage as a policy proposal because they provide 
benefits independent of the drivers of movement.  FMAs allow migrants to avoid the legal burden 
“climate refugees” would face in seeking protection under international refugee law or any other 
multilateral convention modeled on the 1951 Refugee Convention by having to prove they are 
seeking asylum solely based on climate impacts.  The proposal to endow climate migrants with 
climate passports may also be difficult to operationalize due to causality.  The German Advisory 
Council on Global Change therefore recommends identifying island states that are threatened by 
territorial loss, and then granting climate passports to citizens of those states without determining 
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whether each individual is moving due to climate change.107  Although this may work for island 
states, the climate passport may be less suitable outside of the SIDS context where climate impacts 
will not lead to complete loss of territory.  Thus, it would still be largely necessary to determine who 
is eligible for the passport within a given country on an individual basis.  By granting mobility 
privileges based on nationality independent of climate change as a driver, FMAs avoid the issue of 
causality, as well as the problem of privileging climate migrants over other categories of migrants, 
including those migrating for economic reasons.108  
FMAs also provide a regional response to a regional challenge.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, 63% 
of emigrants remain within the region, 109  and 80% remain within the continent.110  Fifty-five percent 
of cross-border movement is intra-regional in Europe and Central Asia,111 while almost a third of 
migrants remain within the Middle East and North Africa, 112  and South Asia.113   Cross-border 
regional movement is especially common in countries that share a common border.114  FMAs can 
capture this short-range cross-border movement. 
Because environmental impacts vary across regions, regional responses to managing 
migration may also be more appropriate.115  FMAs can be tailored to meet regionally-specific needs.  
Furthermore, FMAs allow for flexibility in moving, placing no restrictions on migrants’ ability to 
return home, or re-enter host countries.  Most climate migrants would prefer to stay in place, with 
evidence showing that the majority of migrants return home when possible.116  The fact that FMAs 
facilitate movement intra-regionally may also allow migrants to relocate to countries that share 
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similar cultures and values. This might lessen the adverse impacts of displacement when cross-
border migration is the only viable adaptation option. 
 
ii. FMAs build structural and individual resilience  
 
Economic factors generally play a larger role in determining migration outcomes than 
environmental drivers. 117  The difficulty of detangling economic and environmental drivers in 
migration decisions has stymied attempts to create solutions that support climate migrants in 
particular.  Migrants rarely move due to environmental factors alone, thus invalidating solutions 
targeted only at climate migrants.  However, the weight of economic drivers in environmental 
migration presents an opportunity for climate-induced migration policy solutions to focus on 
building economic capacity.  FMAs, which increase economic resilience at both the structural and 
individual level, can reduce the need for migration in the first place.   
Migration can serve as a development strategy.  African states, for example, supported the 
Global Compact on Migration because of the need to mainstream “migration into development 
strategies that include gainful employment, remittances and financial inclusion and the circulation 
of professionals of all skill levels, and arrangements for free movement.”118  In the Pacific, Australia’s 
Seasonal Worker Program originally aimed to promote economic development in the Pacific Islands, 
but is now used to facilitate adaptation. 119  FMAs can create an enabling framework for capturing 
migration-development co-benefits.  
Moreover, although economists have focused on South-North migratory flows, research on 
the international economic integration indicates that FMAs do have important economic benefits 
intra-regionally. 120   The EU, for example, has witnessed significant gains through its regional 
economic integration scheme.  A number of studies report that the Schengen area, which allows for 
passport free cross-border travel and supports the EU’s single market of free movement of goods, 
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persons, services and capital, confers economic benefits to participating States.121  Bilateral net trade 
increases by 0.09% annually when two countries participate in the Schengen area.122  Intra-European 
trade reached more than €5 trillion in 2014, and has increased over time.  Moreover, the increase in 
immigration associated with the Schengen area has a positive impact on trade; a 1% increase in 
immigration is connected to a 0.09% increase in imports.123  A 2011 study showed that the Schengen 
area “significantly decreases the trade frictions between trade partners and facilitates cross- country 
trade integration.” 124   More research on the benefits of international economic integration is 
warranted.  
While the EU serves as an example of the economic benefits of FMAs, economic inequality 
between States can hinder the efficacy of regional integration schemes.125   The Southern Africa 
Development Community’s (SADC) goal of full free movement by 2005 was scaled back, for 
example, due to concerns that economic disparity within the region would lead to mass migration 
to South Africa.126  SADC’s later protocol eliminated references to free movement, and replaced a 
guaranteed right to entry with state commitment to facilitating entry, residence and establishment.127 
FMAs may also facilitate movement to areas that are similarly environmentally vulnerable.128  
Yet FMAs’ ability to achieve economic gains through integration can lead to increased resilience, 
improving countries’ ability to withstand disasters, and reducing migrant exposure when moving 
to areas with similar geographic vulnerability.   
Migration can also increase economic resilience at a community and individual level. 
Remittances play a key role in increasing community resilience in countries of origin, 129  with 
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payments supporting investments in housing, health, education, and daily subsistence needs.130  A 
U.N. University study in the Pacific found that remittances can help households adapt to climate 
change impacts.131   
Noneconomic exchange also increases community resilience.  When migrants are secure in 
their ability to move between their home and host countries, as FMAs allow, they return often, 
enhancing the adaptive capacity of their communities of origin by increasing understanding of 
climate change risks and responses, strengthening social networks, and transferring goods and new 
skills.132  The majority of migrants of working age participate in the labor market, and migration can 
improve income and living standards.133  Circular, temporary and permanent migration can also 
expand livelihood options.134 
 
iii. FMAs are more politically feasible than a global multilateral agreement & can be 
adapted to the climate context   
 
Though there are certainly exceptions, expanding FMAs to account for climate-induced 
migration is politically feasible in many places.  Neighboring states are more likely to share similar 
concerns and thus can reach consensus more quickly than in a global multilateral process. 135  
Additionally, regional agreements are easier to achieve because fewer states are involved than at a 
global multilateral level, and regions may demonstrate greater levels of mutual trust.136  For these 
reasons,  regional solutions to climate-induced migration provide an important protection stop-gap 
while the international community works to deal with the issue.137   
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Cross-border migration is transnational by definition, and cooperation is possible at the 
regional level in the current political climate. 138  While global multilateral agreements on migration 
prove difficult because of divergent interests between sending and receiving countries and national 
security concerns, states have responded to environmental mobility challenges regionally.139  Some 
states outside the Caribbean region have signaled a willingness to leverage FMAs in the climate 
context.  African States, for example, “have recognised the broader potential of free movement 
agreements as well – noting their potential to provide alternative pathways to durable solutions for 
refugeesi and contribute to improved peace and security within the region.”140  The EU has also 
demonstrated readiness to use its FMA to facilitate movement for EU citizens because of disasters.141 
Practitioners and scholars have supported a regional approach to migration management, 
claiming that states will more likely abrogate their authority at the regional level, and are more 
inclined to negotiate with similarly-situated states.142  Regional arrangements can result in more even 
distribution of benefits between sending and receiving countries, in comparison to bilateral 
agreements, which tend to favor the receiving country.143  FMAs present a legal framework through 
which regional management can operate.  
Requiring fewer states to buy-in than a global multilateral convention, FMAs can also be 
more readily adapted to the demands of climate-induced migration.  One aspect of reform would 
need to be the inclusion of social citizenship.  Past FMAs have demonstrated that granting entry 
without access to citizenship or social benefits can trap migrants in a status as second-rate citizens.  
The Compact of Free Association with Palau, Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands, 
for example, allows visa-free entry into the U.S. but not provide access to citizenship or federal 
benefits.  This makes accessing state-sponsored health care difficult.144  FMAs should come with 
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“regional citizenship” that guarantees economic, social, and political rights” to circumvent 
discrimination against foreign nationals and discourage movement.” 145   Given that few FMAs 
currently guarantee regional citizenship, these frameworks would need to be redesigned to fully be 
protective frameworks.  FMAs would also need to protect against forcible return.146  Many FMAs 
prohibit mass expulsion, cautioning that individual cases for deportation be considered on their own 
merits.  However, provisions that limit state discretion to suspend FMAs or the rights of migrants 
would add further protection.  Re-designing FMAs to fully address climate-induced migration 




Climate change exacerbates environmental migration.  Extreme weather events, including 
frequent and severe storms and drought, have already displaced millions of people worldwide.  As 
climate change intensifies these extreme weather events, an increasing number of climate migrants 
will need to relocate either within their countries or abroad.  The majority of climate-induced 
migration will occur within national borders.  However, climate migrants from SIDS and low-
capacity states are especially at risk given that their ability to respond to disaster is limited.  
FMAs provided a range of protective measures to Caribbean people displaced during the 
2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season.  Two Caribbean FMAs: 
1. Granted disaster displaced persons a right of entry in other islands;  
2. Supported the waiver of travel document requirements where documents had been 
lost or damaged;  
3. Granted indefinite stays in some cases, facilitating permanent resettlement; and 
4. Gave access to foreign labor markets through a mutual recognition of skills scheme 
and/or a waiver of work permit requirements.  
These benefits were critical because climate migrants enjoy no guaranteed rights of entry, work, or 
resettlement when displaced across borders by disaster.  
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Given that 120 countries worldwide participate in FMAs, FMAs could be useful in other 
regional contexts.  Adapting FMAs to address climate-induced migration would be an important 
intervention given that no governing framework for climate-induced migration yet exists, and 
climate migrants enjoy no legal status under international law.  FMAs are particularly well-suited 
to address the climate-induced migration protection gap because they grant access to territory and 
safety regardless of the drivers of movement, which are often difficult to disaggregate.  FMAs also 
provide a regional response to a regional challenge, build economic resilience at the structural and 
individual level, and are more easily amended than global multilateral agreements.   
 Recent international processes such as the Global Compact on Migration, the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the United Nations Framework on Climate Change 
have underscored the importance of climate-induced migration, and advanced recommendations 
for closing the protection gap.  Given the utility of FMAs as a protection stop-gap, FMAs should be 
included in the suite of options used to address climate-induced migration. 
 
                                                      
 
